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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ULL

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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*Reaction to President's Press Conference:/(Information as of 4:30 AM EDT) Initial reaction to President Johnson's press conference is generally mild, with relief frequently expressed that the new US measures to be taken in Vietnam are less drastic than expected.

There has thus far been no authoritative Soviet response to the press conference. Early Moscow radio reports on the President's announcement are generally brief and factual, but a French-language commentary calls the President's declaration "saber-rattling" and a new stage in the escalation of the war. Neither Hanoi nor Peking have responded directly to the press conference, although the New China News Agency quotes adverse French press reaction to the new US measures.

East European reaction is also brief, mild and generally factual. Bucharest and Sofia radios merely broadcast brief reports of the President's announcement, while East Berlin and Budapest stress that the new US measures constitute a new stage in the escalation of the south-east Asian war. Prague radio claims the announcement was "toned down at the last moment," adding that harsher measures were expected. A Yugoslav radio report on the press conference factually reports the President's declaration, noting that he continued to stress American desires for negotiations. The broadcast added that the speech, which was awaited with anxiety, in fact "brought a fair amount of relief."

Initial West European press reaction is also generally mild, and frequent emphasis is placed on the restraint implicit in the limited extent of the US build-up in Vietnam. British papers generally stress that the war is likely to last for a long time, but welcome the restrained nature of the President's declaration. French and West German comments also stress the relative mildness of the President's announcement.

A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman is reported to have stated that the new US measures do not represent

(continued)

a basic change in the US attitude in Vietnam, while Vietnamese Premier Ky reportedly stressed that the new US build-up is an indication of American determination in Southeast Asia. A Ghanaian radio commentary notes that the President emphasised that the US is still ready for peace talks and pointed out that he made "particular mention" of Nkrumah's mission to Hanoi, but additional comment from Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America is still lacking.

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Dominican Republic: Hard-line extremists continue to prepare for a "prolonged war" in the interior.

They have been conducting guerrilla warfare training programs in the rebel zone for selected personnel brought in from the provinces. The Peiping-oriented Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), which has its own "school" for this purpose, had between 180 and 200 under-

going training as of 25 July. on 23 July some 50 persons who had completed their training left the rebel zone for the interior.

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Another training program, evidently under the sponsorship of high officials of the Caamano government, has received some publicity. Caamano has explained it as an innocuous physical training program. The pro-Castro 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) is playing an active role in the program. A prominent APCJ member, "Pichi" Mella Pena,

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is said to be in charge of physical conditioning for guerrilla warfare.

The extremists of the MPD and the APCJ seem confident of their ability to establish one or more viable guerrilla redoubts in the interior, although efforts to do this in late 1963 as well as during the past two months were unsuccessful. A prime reason for their failure seems to have been the hostility of the local peasants.

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NOTES

Greece: Intense political maneuvering continues, but no real progress toward a compromise solution has been reported. Papandreou, by a combination of threats, promises, and cajolery, is still holding the bulk of his parliamentary support in line. If the parliamentary showdown gets under way/tomorrow/ as scheduled, the opposition is likely to stage demonstrations throughout Athens in an effort to force the government to resign before the confidence vote is

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taken.

Cyprus: The US Embassy in Nicosia believes that a lack of control from Athens, caused by the Greek political crisis, may encourage anti-Turkish moves by President Makarios. He has already increased intercommunal tensions by pushing through an amendment of the Cypriot electoral law at the expense of the Turkish Cypriots. Press reaction in Turkey has intensified and, Ankara has reportedly decided to bring the matter before the UN Security Council in the near future.

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UK - South Arabia: (Colonial Secretary Greenwood, in a quick trip to Aden on 24-25 July, won agreement from South Arabian political leaders to meet in London next week to prepare an agenda for independence talks next December. Aden State leaders have resisted previous British efforts to merge them with the backcountry protectorates, and last week refused to receive a British Constitutional Commission. This minor British success does not remove the serious differences between Aden State and the protectorates, but London may at least be able to keep talks going until its future plans for the Aden base have been decided in the <u>defense review now under way. 7</u>

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Common Market: The council meeting of 26-27 July established the important precedent that the council can meet and conduct at least routine business despite the French boycott. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak's attempt at the outset to adjourn the session and convert it into a purely "intergovernmental" meeting was firmly rebuffed by the other four ministers. The council's decision to refer several items of community business to the member governments for approval in writing will either enable the French gracefully to continue necessary community work or force them to extend their present selective boycott into complete non-cooperation.

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